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Abstract 
In a formal description of actions and changes, there is a famous problem known as the “frame 
problem”. In its generalized form, the frame problem is that it is practically impossible to describe, 
or infer, all the necessary preconditions (qualification problem) and all the possible consequences 
of a given action (ramification problem). It is not only difficult to determine what changes and 
what does not change. It is also difficult to determine what is relevant. 
Our observations how that even humans cannot solve the frame problem. Humans simply 
behave as if there were no such problem. The solution is to use some kind of heuristics. We claim 
that the notion of causality is the heuristics necessary to solve the frame problem. 
The most important working hypothesis is that causality is not a logical relation. As one of the 
heuristics it is subject to change as more information becomes available. There are two kinds of 
nonmonotonicity in the reasoning of changes: one due to a lack of information, the other due to 
change itself. We need separate mechanisms for them because they are used in combination to 
solve the frame problem. @ 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. 
Keywords: Knowledge representation; Causality: The frame problem; Heuristics; Context dependency; The 
Yale Shooting Problem 
1. Introduction 
In a formal description of actions and changes, there is a famous problem known 
as the “frame problem” [ 231: we must describe all relationships between actions and 
states including whether or not an action affects a state. The description becomes very 
large and, as a consequence, reasoning takes longer. In its generalized form, the frame 
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problem is that it is practically impossible to describe (or infer) all necessary precondi- 
tions (qualification problem) and all possible consequences of an action (ramification 
problem). It is not only difficult to determine what changes and what does not change 
over time. It is also difficult to determine what is relevant. 
A solution to the frame problem must satisfy the following conditions: 
( 1) Limit the amount of both (a) the description of preconditions and possible 
consequences of actions, and (b) the reasoning necessary to obtain the proper 
consequences. 
(2) Predict correctly the outcome of all actions under any circumstance. 
Since the outcome of an action depends heavily on a situation which theoretically has 
an infinite number of variations, the above requirements seem unsatisfiable. 
In fact, our observations show that even humans cannot solve the frame problem 
[ lo]. Humans significantly reduce the amount of reasoning by circumscribing the scope 
of consideration into the “essential” preconditions and effects. Humans simply behave 
as if there were no such problem because they are very good at limiting their scope 
of consideration to those useful in daily life. In puzzle like game conditions which are 
very remote from their daily life, human are reported to perform badly [ 191. The key is 
to use some heuristics [ 111. We will claim that the notion of causality is the heuristics 
necessary to solve the frame problem. 
What we propose in this paper is therefore a pseudo-solution to the frame problem, 
which works only in practically plausible conditions. For example, when we start our 
car in the morning, we do not usually check that the battery is charged, ignition switch 
is functioning, and so on. Even those who carefully check the above conditions are not 
likely to check if there is a potato stuffed into the exhaust pipe. One of the reasons 
is that we know these things happen very rarely, but more importantly, we can check 
for those conditions after we fail to start the engine. If we cannot make further checks, 
for example when flying an airplane, our initial inspections are made more thoroughly. 
Nonetheless, we sometimes fail to predict some critical failure; we learn from mistakes. 
Why, then, has only logical formulation been the victim of the frame problem? We 
believe that it is the result of a “realistic” view of the world. Realism assumes that objects 
and events exist independent of recognizing agents as do the causal relations among 
events. This has been the unspoken assumption underlying traditional AI formalism, i.e., 
the observe-represent-plan-act paradigm. An agent makes observations to find a correct 
representation of the world. Once a sufficiently correct representation is obtained, the 
agent makes a plan relying solely on the representation and its manipulation. 
This realistic perception of the world leads to the frame problem: how can we correctly 
infer a causal relation without actually activating the real cause, in other words, how 
can we internally simulate the external reality? 
In this paper we take a different approach. The difference is subtle, however, and 
our point of view is not a representationalistic one in which only representations have 
significance. 
Our position can be explained as follows. The reasoning agent certainly lives in an 
actual environment. The agent’s plans may fail occasionally since reality has the ultimate 
authority. However, it is always the agent’s image of the world which determines the 
agent’s plan. Kimura calls this agent’s image “actuality” [ 171. Actuality is not reality 
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itself but the reality-agent interaction. In this respect, our approach is similar to the 
treatment of the frame problem in conjunction with “knowledge-producing actions” 
[3gl. 
Noting that interaction is important, we can now see what was missing in the tra- 
ditional approach. Traditional ogic uses static relations between information. The non- 
monotonic nature of a theorem, if any, is a result of the discovery of new information. 
Causality, on the other hand, is a relationship between changes: one change “causes” 
other changes. The nonmonotonic nature is inherent in the state of the world. In short, 
there are two kinds of nonmonotonicity in the reasoning of changes: one due to lack of 
information, the other due to change itself. Because traditional logic does not have the 
notion of interaction, it fails to distinguish between the above two types of nonmono- 
tonicity. 
We will claim that the notion of causality is the heuristics3 that can be used to solve 
the frame: problem. The most important working hypothesis is that causality is not a 
logical re.lation. It is a heuristic and it is subject o change as more information becomes 
available. 
In the following sections, we formalize the notion of causality, and show its usefulness 
in solving the Yale Shooting Problem. Our framework is unique with respect to the 
following points: 
( 1) We do not presuppose temporal ordering. 
(2) Only local computation is required for computing outcomes of an action. 
(3) Causal rules are situation dependent (therefore the prediction may be wrong 
when those rules are used in the wrong situation). 
We emphasize the second point. The theory of causality in physics claims that the effects 
of an event propagate at the speed of light, and since the equations are symmetric over 
time, the causes of an event also expand at the speed of light toward the past. If we 
consider all possibilities in the light-cone, the complexity of computation is intractably 
large. Only by focusing on “essentially” related facts for an action, we can compute its 
effects. Causality is the heuristics to tell us what is essential. 
2. Causality 
The notion of causality has not only been playing an important role in the theory of 
human cognition, but also in the design of practical systems. For example, CASNET 
[43] has built-in knowledge of the causality between the various factors of a disease 
and its symptoms to help to make a proper diagnosis. Another example can be found in 
an explanation-based learning system [44], in which causality is used to suppress the 
generation of unnecessary macro-operators. 
The general requirement of causality, which is also seen in the above systems, is 
that the result does not precede the cause. Shoham states that the above requirement 
is necessary to make our reasoning efficient [41]. The requirement allows the reason- 
3 The heuristics we are talking about in this paper is on the framework of reasoning (meta-level heuristics), 
not object level rules used in the reasoning. 
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ing process (his attention is on the nonmonotonic reasoning) to proceed in a temporal 
order. It is the economy of our cognitive process which requires the notion of causal- 
ity. 
But unfortunately, using only temporal order is not sufficient. For example, when A 
is always followed by B, there are cases that we do not recognize A being the cause of 
B. McDermott [24] writes: 
Our position is exactly the same. We consider causality as the basic framework of 
If a is approaching from the direction of the sun, the arrival of u’s shadow is 
followed by the arrival of a. But we would not want to say that the arrival of a’s 
shadow causes the arrival of a. 
I assume that there is no way to get around this problem, and that there is no way 
to infer causality merely from correlation. So we will not try to define causality in 
terms of something more basic. Instead, we will assume whatever causal assertions 
we need, and infer events from them. 
the human mind to view the world. Causality is not out there in the world like New- 
ton’s law of gravity. It rather resides in our cognitive ability. By recognizing this, we 
can create a machine capable of reasoning about change in a similar way as humans 
do. 
Even if the notion of causality allows cause and the effect to take place at the same 
time, it at least precludes effect from preceding the cause. A proper theory of causality 
must explain why this is the case. We conjecture that the notion of causality has only 
cognitive value: causality is a cognitive concept used by agents to guide their tactics for 
survival in the real world. In other words, the following notion is essential for an agent 
to be able to control its environment: 
Cause is an action to produce a desired state. 
When an agent cannot be in the desired state directly, it must use some indirect means 
to realize the state. Causality is used to reason this. For example, causality like: 
l turning on the heater causes the room temperature to rise, 
l eating causes the stomach to become full, 
are used to make a room warmer, or to reduce hunger. By using those rules, an agent can 
reason that it should turn on the heater when it feels cold. As discussed in many places, 
those causal relations are not logical implications. The cause is neither a necessary nor 
sufficient condition for the effect. When windows of the room are open, turning on the 
heater does not make the room warm. The room temperature may be increased by other 
means, like turning on an air conditioner instead of the heater. 
We can analyze causal relations as follows: 
( 1) When correlation between the occurrence of events of type4 A and the occur- 
rence of events of type B are very high, and an instance of A (denoted as LX) 
and an instance of B (denoted as p) have both occurred, then (Y is said to be 
the cause of /?. Note that A (a) and B (p) are symmetric so far. 
4 We assume that an event type is characterized by a set of sentences that events satisfy. 
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(2) Even when in general, A and B occur together, if an instance p occurs without 
occurrence of cy, then (Y is not the cause of /3 (for this particular case). 
(3) Therefore, even when LY and p occurred together, if there is a (hypothetical) 
wa.y to eliminate only (Y, then (Y is not the cause of p. This means that p could 
have occurred without a. 
(4) In our world, when cy occurs after p, there exist some, though hypothetical, 
means to remove cr. Thus cy is not called the cause. Therefore, a cause cannot 
temporally follow its effect. 
In short, controllability of events is the key concept in causality. In our physical world, 
if the cause temporarily follows the effect, it cannot be used to control the situation. 
This temporal requirement is, however, not essential to the notion of causality. It just 
happens to be the necessary condition for causality in our physical world.5 
Causality has wider applications as stated earlier. In those areas, some other partial 
order is used, since there may be no concept of time in some of the areas, for example 
in reflections. A reflection is defined as “causally connected self representation” [ 421 in 
which the following two constraints are imposed over a program P and its representation 
MP (we will use ‘$3” to denote “causes” whose definition is given later) : 
changes in P % changes in MP, 
changes in MP % changes in F! 
Also in qualitative reasoning, hypothetical causality is introduced to simulate some of 
simultaneous phenomena [ 51. 
There is even a claim that temporal ordering is not essential in a causal relation [ 11. 
Anzai also discusses the relation between causal relations and controllability using an 
example t,o reason why a student got a bad score on an examination. As a cause of the 
bad score (result), the student may point out that insufficient preparation was made or 
the student was not well, but the student never points out that one of the causes was 
that the teacher gave bad scores or that the examination took place. 
When causal relations (written as %“) form a circular chain like LY $ /3 and 
p $ LY, it becomes hard to predict what happens. Therefore, some kind of partial order 
is required. In our formalism, we do not require temporal ordering. Only a partial order 
between the cause and the result suffices. The partial order is not explicitly mentioned 
in the theory, but it is implicit in how causal relations are used for reasoning. 
To summarize, we formalize causality as a cognitive rule to allow us to control 
changes in the world. It is the decision of the reasoning agent on what set of causal 
rules are to be used in any given situation. Since this differs from natural laws, it may 
not necessarily be complete nor sound. If the agent has or applies a wrong set of causal 
rules, then the result simply differs from what will actually happen in the world. In 
this sense, even a human cannot reason perfectly. The human from time to time will 
mis-forecast events. What we need is a program to guess wrong as often as a human, 
not a program to compute one hundred percent correctly. The latter is impossible. 
5 One could argue that the very notion of time is derivable from the notion of causality (for example, [ 34, 
pp. 304-3091, [ 13,141). But it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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3. The frame problem 
When first pointed out by McCarthy and Hayes [ 231, the frame problem was presented 
as a problem of how to efficiently describe a change of state due to the actions of some 
agent. The difficulty in describing a state change is that the description tends to be very 
large: when there are n actions and m states, one must describe n x m combinations of 
rules. The amount of descriptions will therefore explode exponentially. 
To solve the frame problem, one has to do at least two things. The first is to make 
an assumption similar to “everything else shall remain unchanged” in order to minimize 
the description required. This notion introduces nonmonotonicity such as when one fails 
to conclude that something changes due to lack of information. The second requirement 
is to minimize the description of the things that do change. Practical examples include 
STRIPS [ 71 which tries to meet the former requirement by introducing some procedural 
features so that actions have side effects which rewrite the world state. However, such 
a procedural method tends to become too complicated and the latter requirement is not 
satisfied. Sandewall proposed an UNLESS operator [36] to try to satisfy the former 
requirement using a symbolic logic framework. Furthermore, since logic is usually 
declarative, the latter requirement is generally far better met using such a setting than 
in the procedural framework of STRIPS. This line of research gave rise to a number 
of types of nonmonotonic logic, including default logic [ 351, nonmonotonic logic, 
circumscription [ 2 11, etc. 
We have to give up the need for a generic formal framework for describing (and 
inferring) all related conditions. However, we still need a framework to allow a descrip- 
tion of any related conditions. We propose a “situated” description of causal relations 
to satisfy this requirement. This framework is, unlike STRIPS, based on logic, and 
thus leads to problems of nonmonotonic reasoning, as exemplified in the Yale Shooting 
Problem (YSP) [ 9,20,37]. A proper solution of YSP requires the ability to compute 
not only consistent, but also preferable sets of assumptions. The problem here is that 
preference criteria cannot be given logically. 
Nonmonotonic logic does not distinguish between two apparently different notions: 
causal relations and logical relations. We claim that this is the source of YSP, and by 
introducing the notion of causality, we can solve YSP together with the frame problem. 6 
When reasoning about actions and situation changes, it is essential to distinguish 
between causal and logical relations. The former are unidirectional, i.e., rules have 
ordering between the cause and the result. Logical rules, on the other hand, describe 
static relations between an antecedent and a consequent, and thus are bidirectional: P + 
Q can be used to infer Q from P, or to infer -P from -Q. Previously, we proposed 
a theory of action in which primary (causal) and secondary (logical) relations are 
distinguished [ 331. 
The ability to make the distinction becomes crucial in nonmonotonic reasoning. For 
example, let us consider a rule “those with wings fly”. When interpreted as expressing 
6 As we stated earlier, even humans cannot solve the frame problem. The solution presented here is thus a 
quasi-solution that circumvents the frame problem, as humans do. 
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a causality. this rule means “when you attach wings to a non-flying object, it can fly”. 
The action of attaching wings causes nonmonotonicity in the property of flying. 
When the same rule is interpreted as a logical rule, and applied to an object x known 
not to fly (+y(x)), then the rule cannot be used to make fly(x) true. Rather, the 
implication, winged(x) ---f JIy(x), together with winged(x) and +y(x) introduces a 
logical contradiction. To avoid this rigidity of ordinary logic, nonmonotonic logics were 
invented. In nonmonotonic logics, rules are weakened to cope with partial informa- 
tion. 
The frame problem is associated with causality, not with a static, logical description of 
the world. Furthermore, the notion of causality was developed as a way for a cognitive 
agent to control its environment. When an agent makes a plan to achieve a goal, it will 
invoke some (not all) of its knowledge about causal relations. The range of knowledge 
involved depends on the situation and the agent. Since an agent uses only a subjectively 
determined set of causal rules, we can avoid the qualification problem which requires the 
set of rules to reflect reality perfectly. Furthermore, when an agent performs reasoning 
based only on the subjective set of causal relations, the agent can confirm its result 
with the real environment and when it is correct (possibly by chance), there is no 
need for further processing. An agent can adjust its set of causal relations so that its 
prediction matches the reality in critical situations. By this way, an agent avoids the 
ramification problem. In other words, an agent can only survive in an environment 
where its prediction matches reality at critical points. 
Humans acquired a proper set of causal relations as the result of evolution over a 
long period of time. We must give those relations as a set of programs, and we should 
observe human in order to extract the correct set. A discussion on the content of causal 
relations is beyond the scope of this paper. 
We assume the following: 
Hypothesis 1. Only the positive flow of causality towards a goal is considered. 
That is, only a set of controllable causal relations which helps to realize the goal is 
considered, just as typical AI planners do, and uncontrollable causes are left unconsid- 
ered. 7 
For example, in YSP viewed from the point of view of an assassin, the goal is to kill 
the target aad get away: 
goal: kill, escape. 
The assassin may use knowledge such as the use of a bullet made of ice in order to 
erase any evidence, but (s)he will not consider a bullet proof vest, because it is not 
positively connected to the goal. 
The secret service agent who is responsible for protecting the target has the goal: 
goal: not dead. 
7 Causal relations to block achievement of desired state anz considered to be within positive flow if its cause 
is controllable. 
40 H. Nakashima et al. /Artificial Intelligence 91 (1997) 33-50 
The agent will consider putting a bullet proof vest on the target, but will not consider 
the material of the bullet because it cannot be controlled. 
Of course, there may be a very careful assassin or secret service agent who considers 
both the bullet proof vest and the material of the bullet. This depends on their planning 
modes and the information that they have. 
when an assassin knows that there are protective agents, the assassin will shift to a 
more careful mode of planning, where things that have a negative causality to the goal 
are also considered. There are many possibilities for setting up the planning environment, 
and there are priorities among the rules involved. 
We require a reasoning system with the following ability to support situated reason- 
ing: ’ 
l The system can handle multiple sets of axioms. 
l At each reasoning, only a subset of axioms are used, and they are interchangeable 
at run time. 
l There is a dynamically assigned priority9 between each rule in the axiom sets. 
Hypothesis 2. The reasoning process JEows only in one direction determined by the 
partial order of the causal relations (temporal order). 
In the following, we use temporal ordering as the partial order, but the following 
argument applies to any kind of partial order, 
There are various nonmonotonic reasoning systems. Their reasoning is symmetric over 
time and reasoning in the reverse temporal order is no more difficult than reasoning in the 
temporal order. However, since temporal ordering is one of the requirements for causal 
reasoning, we must use temporal ordering carefully. There are two cases: reasoning from 
a past state to a future state, and reasoning from a future state back to a past state. These 
two cases are not symmetric. They are both based (at least locally) on a one way causal 
flow from the past to the future, and therefore the reasoning system must follow the 
same direction. 
Strictly speaking, imposed temporal order is not inherent in the object system but 
inherent in the reasoner. Those two time flow match each other in conventional cases, 
but we can think of special cases such as time travel. Suppose a person travels backward 
in time and kills his father before the person was born. The causal reasoning must follow 
the order of ( 1) current state, and (2) assassination in past, not the other way around 
as from (2) to ( 1) . If we follow the latter order, which matches the objective time flow, 
the famous paradox of time travel appears. 
Temporal order should be used as follows (here we must assume that the agent knows 
what action took place): 
( 1) When an agent reasons from the cause to the results, rules are applied to a state 
to compute the resulting state. 
8 Uranus [28] satisfies all the requirements. 
g We do not go into the details of priority mechanism in this paper, The interested reader should consult our 
previous papers [ 26,271. 
(2) 
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When an agent reasons from the result to the cause, on the other hand, it is 
not so straightforward. One must assume the previous state and apply the causal 
relation forward to see if that result matches the known state. 
4. Theory of causality 
4.1. Situation theory 
The formalization of causality in this paper is based on an extension [ 3 1,321 of 
situation theory ]4,6]. However, situation theory is not the essential vehicle of our 
formalism, any context-dependent formalization, including [ 8,221, can be used. The 
important requirement is that the theory provides us with the ability to treat situations 
separately. A second-order version of situation calculus satisfies part of the requirements 
and allows us to name situations (states of the world). For example a state S in which 
a block A is on B, is represented in situation calculus as: 
holds(on(A, B), S), 
and is represented in situation theory as: 
S + {(on, A, B)). 
These look; like syntactic variations. However, situation theory provides a larger flexi- 
bility that is missing in situation calculus, such as: 
( 1) the ability to group rules or facts, 
(2) the ability to express partial ordering between situations, and 
(3) the ability to limit the scope of reasoning. 
The following is a simple sketch of situation theory. lo 
In the theory, there is a set of relations, a set of objects, and the set (0, 1) of polarities. 
Information about a situation is represented as a set of infons, which are composed of a 
relation, some objects, and a polarity. Let R be an n-ary relation, 0i (i = 1,. . . , n) any 
objects, and P a polarity, then ((R, 01,. . . , 0,; P)) is an infon. If P is 1, the infon is 
called a positive infon, and represents positive information such as “a canary can fly”. 
In the following sections of this paper, we will omit the polarity when it is 1. If P is 
0, it is called a negative infon, and represents negative information such as “a penguin 
can not fly”. The dual “8” of an infon “a” is the infon which differs from (+ only in 
polarity. 
One of the essential ideas of situation theory is that situations are objects and they 
support infons (or infons hold in situations). We can take any conceptual entity as 
a situation (eg., spatio-temporal region, an agent’s knowledge, a hypothetical world, 
etc.). Let :; be a situation and g an infon, then the following expression represents the 
proposition that s supports u: s k g. For example, the capital of the USA is Washington, 
DC in 1996, Thus, the situation earth1996 supports the infon that the capital of the USA 
lo See [3] for further details about situation theory, and [ 311 for how to use it in reasoning. 
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is Washington, DC: earth]996 /= ((capital, USA, Wushington,DC)). I’ Situations are used 
in a wide sense in our formalization. For example, the knowledge space of an agent is 
also treated as a situation. 
We will also write s b 2 where 2 is a set of infons iff Vu E 2s b CT. 
4.2. Cuusul relations 
Definition 3. Let St and S2 be situations, and ACTION an action. I2 Then, 
Si [ACTION] S2 is a proposition which states that ACTION occurs between situations 
Si and S2, that is, St is changed into S2 by ACTION. Note that the change is not always 
guaranteed even if ACTION occurs in Sr . 
Definition 4. ACTION is nothing but a change of state. It is given as a primitive in our 
formalism. 
Definition 5. We formalize causality as a ternary relation of 
CONDITION x ACTION x RESULT, 
and represent it in the form 
CONDITION : [ACTION] 6 RESULT, 
where both CONDITION and RESULT are sets of infons. 
Definition 6. RESULT is also a change of state. It is a union of negative and positive 
infons. Negative infons correspond to the states which no longer hold and positive infons 
correspond to the states which now hold. 
Definition 7. 
CONDITION : [ACTION] $ RESULT 
is a “negative causal relation”. 
It should be noted that a negative cause is different from 
CONDITION : [ACTION] 3 -T. 
The former expression indicates that the next situation is prevented from additionally 
supporting RESULT, while the latter expression forces the next situation to support the 
inverse of RESULT. 
When there are both positive and negative causal relations applicable to the same 
action, the reasoning system must choose one of them. We assume that the reasoning 
l1 For a positive infon, the polarity may be omitted. 
I2 See [ 331 regarding the formalization of an action in situation theory. 
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agent has some priority for these rules (the priority may change during reasoning) and 
the one with the highest priority is used. 
Let x and y be infons; X, Z’, Y and Y’ be sets of infons; S1 and S2 situations; and A 
an action. Then the following axioms hold: 
Axiom 8. If X : [A] &- Y holds, then for all y E I: 
(Sl[~4lS2) A (Sl I= X) -+ (S2 t= Y> 
if 
+X’,Y’.{ 
( 
X’: [A] $ Y’ AX’ C XAy E Y’}. 
> 
Axiom 8 says that when some action causes some infon to hold, then it holds unless 
the same action is known to fail ($) in the same situation. 
Axiom 9. rf& b x A S1 [A]&, then 
{4X,+, /=Y) A (y: [A] AX) AHEX)} +Sz /=x. 
Axiom !a corresponds to the frame axiom. In other words, when an infon holds in a 
situation, it holds in the next situation unless any causal relations prevent the situation 
from supporting it. 
The triplet of CONDITION, ACTION, and RESULT forms a causal relation, but any 
pair does not. For example, CONDITION is not a necessary condition of ACTION 
(ACTION may be feasible under another condition even if CONDITION does not hold), 
nor is it a sufficient condition of ACTION (this characteristic comes from the frame 
problem that it is impossible to describe the preconditions for an action completely). 
Similarly, ACTION is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of RESULT (another 
action can cause RESULT, or a negative causal relation may prevent RESULT from 
holding). 
By limiting the description of causality, our formalization circumvents the problem 
arising from the requirement to describe all preconditions for all actions. Prediction of 
the future :state depends on a set of causal relations, which are not necessarily correct, 
and there is no guarantee that each result of reasoning corresponds correctly with the 
real world. However, the problem of describing all preconditions for actions in the frame 
problem appears only when you try to have a complete description of the world, which 
even humans cannot do. 
5. Application: YSP 
Situation calculus is widely used to formalize time flow in logic. Let T(f, s) be a 
second-ord,er predicate to mean that f is true in situation s, and R(a, s) be a function 
from situation s and action a to a new situation corresponding to the result of the action 
a in s. We further need a frame axiom: 
44 
Table 1 
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First solution Action Second solution 
to ALIVE ALIVE 
LOAD 
tl ALIVE, LOADED ALIVE, LOADED 
WAIT 1M LOADED 
t2 ALIVE, LOADED ALIVE 
TM ALIVE SHOOT 
t3 -ALIVE, LOADED ALIVE 
Vf,s,a.(W,~) AM-nds(a,.f,s) --+Uf,R(a,s))) 
where ends( a, f, s) means action a in situation s makes the proposition f false, and M 
is an modal operator for consistency and defined as follows: 
L- Mp -if ‘p. 
YSP is a problem to show that the above framework is insufficient: 
l At to, A is alive (ALIVE). 
l At to, a gun is loaded (LOAD). 
l At t 1, some irrelevant event occurs ( WAIT). 
l At t2, a gun is fired upon A (SHOOT). 
l At t3, is A alive? 
The above problem is expressed as follows: 
T(ALZVE, to), 
tIs.T(LOADED, R(LOAD,s)), 
Vs.T( -ALIVE, R(SHOOT, s) ) , 
t/s.T( LOADED, s) -+ ends( SHOOT, ALIVE, s) , 
tl = R(LOAD, to), 
t2 = R(WAZT,tl), 
t3 = R(SHOOT, t2). 
When a human reasons, normally he concludes that A is dead at t3, i.e., T( -ALIVE, 
t3). In various nonmonotonic reasoning frameworks, there is one more solution: 
At t2, the gun is not loaded, and at t3, A is alive. 
The above two solutions are reached in the reasoning shown in Table 1. 
The second solution corresponds to reasoning in reverse temporal order. First we 
assume ALIVE from tl to t3, using the frame axiom on ALIVE at to. Then at t2, from 
ALIVE and 
Vs.( ends(SHOOT, ALIVE, s) t T(LOADED, s)) 
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we can logically conclude 7LOADED. This conclusion is consistent if we do not apply 
the frame axiom to LOADED at tl (by the action WAIT, the gun gets unloaded, or 
M ends(‘WAIT,LOADED,R(LOAD(s)))). 
Previously existing nonmonotonic formalisms cannot select any one of the solution as 
being more plausible than any other, because the preference is outside the scope of the 
formalism. Shoham [40] succeeded to leave the preferred solution of YSP by limiting 
the inference in the temporal order. However his solution was not general enough to 
be applicable to the stolen car problem, in which a car was found stolen after it had 
been parked for ten days (ten consecutive WAIT actions). Shoham’s “chronologically 
maximal ignorance” concludes that the car was stolen at the tenth day, the latest possible 
instance, and the conclusion is criticized as unnatural. 
In our formalism, a set of causal rules are goal dependent. In YSP, we can have two 
different sets of goal-dependent rules, and only one of the solutions is derived at each 
setting. In the stolen car problem, since we do not have a proper causal rule for stealing 
a car, no conclusion on the date of the robbery is derivable. 
Now let us formalize YSP. First, we assume that every agent in this example knows 
all the logical relations (i.e., not the causal relations) necessary for solving YSP such 
as ((dead, x)) + ((alive, x)). 
Then, we specify the causal relations, which are divided into the following two 
classes: 
l The causal relations which all agents know, such as 
: [Zoad(x,y)] 4 ((loaded,x, y)), 
((loaded, x, y)) : [ shoot( x, a) ] $ ((dead, a)), 
where x, y and a are variables whose scopes are local to each rule. 
l The causal relations which only some agents know, such as 
SP k (((bullet-proof, u)) : [shoot(x, a) 1 $ ((de& a))), 
assassin + (((ice, y)) : [wait] $ ((Zmddx,~))). 
Causal re:lations in the latter class are local to each agent. Only those agents who have 
the knowledge can make use of them in making predictions. It should also be noted 
that other agents may have the latter class of causal relations, but do not make use 
of them (agents are not logically omnipotent) and thus are excluded from the latter 
class. 
Here we use “SP” and “assasin” to denote knowledge of the seculity police and the 
assasin respectively. The justification of using a situation to denote a set knowledge of 
an agent is given elsewhere [29-321. It is one of the essential points of our formalism 
that a set of causal relations used in reasoning is not fixed. Even the same agent may 
use a different set of causal relations if put in a different state. 
The preconditions differ in the above two causal relations involving “dead”. This is 
because the described information in each relation is related to the positive or negative 
goal of killing, that is, causal relations are described based on intention. 
46 H. Nakashitna et al. /Art@cial Intelligence 91 (1997) 33-50 
Let us consider the following actions under the above assumptions: 
f0 + ((alive, A)), 
t0 + ((ice, bulletl)), 
rO[load(gunl, bulletl) I tl, 
tl [wait] t2, 
t2[shoor(gunl,A)]t3, 
where to, t 1, t2 and t3 are situations. There are two different logical extensions in YSP, 
depending on the priorities between “alive” and “loaded” (they cannot both be true since 
“loaded” causes “dead”). In our formalization, either solution is clearly selected by an 
agent as a result of only using the causal relations relative to the goal of that agent. 
Therefore, in the above setting with “wait”, SP ironically concludes “dead”, because 
“bullet-proof ‘, which prevents the result “dead”, does not hold at t0 (or, at least SP 
does not know of it). On the other hand, the assassin concludes “alive” because he 
knows of “ice” which prevents him from deducing “loaded” after “wait”. The different 
conclusions come from the following: 
( 1) SP does not have the information that the bullet is made from ice, and 
(2) SP does not have the causal relation to exploit the information even if the material 
of the bullet is known. 
The same conclusion would be reached if we make 
l t0 b ((ice, bdetl)) as part of the assassin’s knowledge, and 
l ((ice, y)) : [wait] & ((loaded, x, y)) as public knowledge, 
because both of them are needed by a single agent to conclude otherwise. 
In our framework, priority among rules is governed by the following mechanisms: 
( 1) Reasoning follows the order of actions. 
(2) Rule sets used are changed. 
One of the essential problems of YSP is that even if you can solve YSP completely 
with a certain preference, there would be some modified versions of YSP which you 
could not completely solve with the same preference. 
The reason for this is that the parts which should be treated as rules relative to 
each problem are fixed in the reasoning mechanism when using the nonmonotonic logic 
approach. In our formalism, on the other hand, descriptions of causality changes as the 
problem changes. A fixed reasoning strategy is unnecessary. We represent actions using 
a partial order, and reasoning is controlled by the description of causality. I3 
To solve some complicated problems, it is sometimes necessary to reason in a reversed 
time order. There has been no detailed discussion on these cases. Now we can see that 
when a causal rule is applied, it is wrong to apply it in the reverse order (as in 
the case of contraposition) even when we know only the result state. For example, 
when inferring “not loaded” from the information “alive” in the final state t3, our 
system implemented on Uranus [25] examines the possibility of “alive” in t3 on the 
I3 Or, rather, we can say causality is invented to govern reasoning. 
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supposition that “loaded” holds in t2 (can we conclude “alive” assuming “loaded”?). l4 
The supposition is considered true if “alive” holds in t3. Otherwise, the supposition is 
refuted. By keeping the direction of application of causal rules constant (always from a 
cause to its result), we can guarantee the same result between an inference chain from 
past to future and from future to past. 
To summarize, we showed the following points using YSP as an example: 
l By using a goal-dependent set of causal rules, a proper solution is obtainable 
(solution for YSP) . 
l By separating causal rules and logical rules, and limiting the application order of 
causal rules, we can get the same result regardless of the direction of the inference 
(solution for the stolen car problem). 
6. Related work 
6.1. In general 
There are too many related works to cite here. Before we go into the details, let 
us make some general comments. Approaches based on situation calculus and non- 
monotonic logic do not distinguish two kinds of nonmonotonicity: one due to lack of 
information, the other due to change itself. It is mainly due to the framework of sit- 
uation calc:ulus, which is essentially a scheme to map dynamic changes into a static 
logical framework. Nonmonotonicity due to change was then mapped into nonmono- 
tonicity due to a lack of information. In our formalism, we separate them. Nonmonotonic 
reasoning ;is used in cases of information changes, causality is used in cases of state 
changes. 
As pointed out in Sections 3 and 5, however, causal relations about the same action 
need nonmonotonic reasoning. In our formalism, these two kinds of nonmonotonicity 
do not interfere with each other. In our YSP example, SP has two causal relations about 
[ shoot( x, II) 1, one leading to dead, the other preventing it. Preference of these rules is 
computed ,without any consideration on the resulting state. 
Our approach based on causality uses situation theory as a basis of formalization. 
Situation theory is similar to situation calculus in that they both treat situation-dependent 
properties (called “infon” in situation theory and “fluent” in situation calculus). In 
situation theory, and particularly in our approach, however, situations are independent 
with each other. There is no global notion of minimization for all situations. This enables 
us to divide logical and causal relations. Logical consistency is imposed only within 
each situation. Is Baker’s approach [21 is closer in principle to situation theory although 
his framework is based on situation calculus. His approach relies on having a set of 
locally consistent situations. 
I4 If we do not have any assumption, we have to create one. This is hypothetical reasoning and therefore. 
outside the scope of this paper. 
l5 It is also possible to impose logical constraints over several situations if we want. But this differs from 
situation calculus in which all constraints are taken to be global, and no local constraints are expressible. 
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Within these mixed (causal and logical) approaches, some other standard should be 
given to select the proper extension from many logically equivalent ones. Shoham [40] 
used “chronologically maximal ignorance” as such a preference mechanism. This favors 
extensions with a minimal change in temporal order. 
But chronological minimization cannot be applied to backward reasoning. When you 
find your car is stolen after the action sequence [park-cur; wait; wait], it is unnatural to 
assume that the car was stolen after the second wait, and not the first wait [2,16]. 
Shanahan explains it by abduction [39]. The distinction between deduction and ab- 
duction here is essentially the same as our distinction of direction (as partial order). 
6.2. Causality 
McDermott [24] introduced causality as a primitive. However, his formalization re- 
quested the complete description of the precondition. This leads to the qualification 
problem. We avoided this by making causal rules nonmonotonic. 
Haugh [ 121 and Lifschitz [ 181 proposed approaches to YSP based on causal min- 
imization. Causal relations are explicitly written and those without explicit cause (like 
being loaded) remains the same. Haugh postulates two kinds of causality: potential cause 
and determined cause, and Lifschitz has two kinds of fluent: primitive and non-primitive. 
However, those approaches still do not clearly distinguish causal relations from logical 
relations (they do not allow logical relations to begin with) and do not minimize them 
separately. Their division is applied, so to speak, in the wrong place. 
The stolen car problem mentioned above also imposes a problem on these approaches. 
Since things cannot change without explicit causal relation, one must have a rule like 
“waiting causes a car be stolen”. In that case, the car will be stolen twice at both wait 
actions. In our approach, this nonmonotonicity can be absorbed as a lack of information. 
We do not know the cause, and so we can conclude nothing about the timing of the 
stealing. 
Shoham [41] developed a more elaborate theory of causality. Moreover, he separates 
the causality and nonmonotonicity of knowledge. But he takes temporal order as a pre- 
requisite of causality and uses temporal logic to represent it. This limits the application 
area of his theory. Our approach can equally be applied to causal relations without 
using temporal notions as discussed in, for instance, Iwasaki and Simon [ 151. When 
we regard [infer] as an action, and use temporal logic to describe mental states, then 
Shoham’s formalism may be mapped into ours. 
7. Conclusion 
We started from the recognition of the fact that even humans cannot completely solve 
the generalized frame problem: we cannot draw a line between related and unrelated 
information before we reason about changes. We have presented a framework in which 
a program can reason about change in a way similar to that used by humans. 
We used the notion of causality as the key. The notion of causality as the framework 
of our cognitive processes is used to solve the frame problem. In particular: 
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( 1) Only causal rules positively related to the goal are used. 
(2) The order of reasoning is important. 
(3) Causal rules are unidirectional. We cannot take the contraposition of a causal 
rule. We have to always apply it in the direction from a cause to its result. 
Causal rules are cognitive and reflect our understanding of the world. They therefore 
reflect an agent’s recognition of the problem domain. A slight change of the problem 
may affect this recognition, and thus, the representation f the rules. 
In the case of YSP, since the direction of time and direction of causality are the same, 
other approaches with temporal ordering can yield the same result as ours. However we 
sometime:s u e our framework to understand the reasoning of a human with certain goal. 
In those cases, our approach is better. 
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